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Marcus Bauer 
Independent Study 
 
Public Anticorruption in Morocco and Tunisia: A Comparative Study 
 
I. Introduction 
In December 2010, Mohamed Bouazizi, an obscure Tunisian street vendor set himself on 
fire as a sign of public protest.1 This seemingly insignificant incident in a small town in Tunisia 
would lead to the Arab Spring and the overthrow of the Tunisian government.2 Bouaziziz’s act of 
self-immolation was not meant to spark public protests that spread across North Africa and the 
Middle East and overthrew governments. It was merely his response to public corruption, which the 
academic literature and this paper defines as “the abuse of public office for private gain.”3 For years, 
corrupt government officials and police officers in Bouazizi’s home town of Sidi Bouzid regularly 
forced him to pay bribes.4 When Bouazizi refused, they seized or destroyed his goods. After racking 
up considerable debt to offset his losses from the bribes and confiscated goods, Bouazizi’s goods 
were confiscated by police asking for a bribe for a final time.5 After petitioning the local government 
to return his items and receiving no answer, Bouazizi believed that it was impossible to make a living 
in Tunisia and self-immolation was his only possible response.6  
																																																						
1 Peter Beaumont, Mohammed Bouazizi: The Dutiful Son Whose Death Changed Tunisia’s Fate, 
THE GUARDIAN (January 20, 2011), available at 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/jan/20/tunisian-fruit-seller-mohammed-bouazizi.  
2 Marc Fisher, In Tunisia, Act of One Fruit Vendor Sparks Wave of Revolution Through Arab 
World, THE WASHINGTON POST (March 26, 2011), available at 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/in-tunisia-act-of-one-fruit-vendor-sparks-wave-of-
revolution-through-arab-world/2011/03/16/AFjfsueB_story.html. 
3 Corruption Action Plan Working Group, “Helping Countries Combat Corruption: The Role of 
the World Bank,” Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Network, World Bank, 8, 
September 1997, available at 
http://www.worldbank.org/publicsector/anticorrupt/corruptn/corrptn.pdf. 
4 Lin Noueihed, Peddler’s Martyrdom Launched a Tunisia’s Revolution, REUTERS (January 19 
2011), available at https://af.reuters.com/article/libyaNews/idAFLDE70G18J20110119. 
5 Id.  
6 Id.  
Dealing with public corruption is a part of life for many in North Africa. And, this type of 
rampant corruption leads to a two significant negative effects that threaten to cripple the developing 
countries in the region. The most obvious negative effect of corruption is economic loss. A World 
Bank study found that some North African countries lose the equivalent of two percent of GDP per 
year because of corruption.7 This economic loss occurs because public procurements are awarded to 
undeserving businesses through a system of wasta—an Arabic word meaning patronage or a special 
influence through connections8—or bribery, foreign investors are deterred from investing in these 
countries with high levels of public corruption,9 and many economic transactions result in money 
being siphoned to the state.10 Although the economic consequences from public corruption can be 
severe, the most pernicious effect of corruption is the erosion of trust between the public and the 
government. When citizens are forced to pay bribes for government services, to avail themselves of 
a biased judicial system, or to cede job or government contract to well-connected individuals, their 
faith in government institutions wanes. This may result in a dramatic regime change like Tunisia or  
																																																						
7 Sarah Yerkens, Corruption, Not Terrorism, is Tunisia’s Biggest Threat, CARNEGIE EUROPE 
(December 8, 2017) (“A World Bank study estimated that in the decade before the revolution, 
Tunisia lost on average an amount equivalent to about 2 percent of its GDP per year due to 
corruption.”); See Bob Rijkers, Caroline Freund, & Antonio Nucifora, All in the Family: State 
Capture in Tunisia, The World Bank, March 2014; See also, Corruption, Tax Evasion, Criminal 
Activity Cost Tunisia $1.16 Billion Per Year, GLOBAL FINANCIAL INTEGRITY, Jan. 15, 2011, 
https://www.gfintegrity.org/press-release/corruption-tax-evasion-criminal-activity-cost-tunisia-
us1-16-billion-per-year-2000-2008/ 
8 See generally, Andy Barnett, Bruce Yandle, & George Naufal, Regulation, Trust, and 
Cronyism in Middle Eastern Societies: The Simple Economics of “Wasta”, 44 J. OF SOCIO-
ECONOMICS 41 (2013).  
9 The reason for this is two-fold. First, companies are concerned about the high cost of doing 
business in countries where officials expect to receive bribes or kickbacks. Second, and perhaps 
more importantly, companies are wary of foreign regulators, such as U.S. regulators through the 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act or U.K. regulators through the UK Bribery Act, using the 
domestic laws of those countries to prosecute businesses that pay bribes abroad.  
10 Sarah Yerkens, Corruption, Not Terrorism, is Tunisia’s Biggest Threat, CARNEGIE EUROPE 
(December 8, 2017) (“In a corrupt economy, every economic transaction has a corruption tax—
an amount of money that is being siphoned away from the state.”).  
it may lead to protests in the street calling for reform like in Morocco.11 Either way, public 
corruption clearly has a corrosive effect on people’s belief in their government.  
Of the North African countries only two, Morocco and Tunisia, recognized public 
corruption as a major problem and made efforts in the past ten years to address it. Both countries 
have enacted recent reforms that are worthy of greater study including asset declaration laws, 
whistleblower protections, and new commissions to investigate and report on public corruption. 
These reforms have been recognized by independent observers and as a result Morocco and Tunisia 
have both seen positive results in Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index, which 
ranks countries from least to most corrupt.12 Since 2014, Morocco has risen eighteen spots and 
Tunisia has risen four spots on the annual rankings.13 In 2018, Morocco and Tunisia were tied as the 
73rd least corrupt countries in the world.14 However, although many of their reforms have been 
similar, Morocco’s and Tunisia’s anticorruption regimes are different in a number of crucial respects, 
mostly relating to their different forms of government.15 This paper will explore the differences and 
similarities between the current anticorruption efforts in Morocco and Tunisia.  
Section II will examine how public corruption manifests itself, the root causes of public 
corruption, and the history of public corruption and the government’s response in each country. It 
will then discuss the current state of public corruption in Morocco and Tunisia. Section III will 
																																																						
11 Eric Andrew-Gee, Making Sense of Tunisia, The New Republic (January 16, 2011) (arguing 
along with Harvard professor William Granara that the corruption of the ruling family in Tunisia 
was largely responsible for the revolution.). 
12 Corruption Perceptions Index: Overview, TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL, available at 
https://www.transparency.org/research/cpi. 
13 CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS INDEX 2018, TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL (2018), available at 
https://www.transparency.org/cpi2018; CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS INDEX 2014, TRANSPARENCY 
INTERNATIONAL (2014), available at https://www.transparency.org/cpi2014. 
14 CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS INDEX 2018, TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL (2018).  
15 Tunisia’s government is best described as a parliamentary democracy, while Morocco’s 
government is best described as a constitutional monarchy in which the monarch still retains a 
significant amount of constitutional and political power.  
analyze the similarities and differences between the current anticorruption regimes and hypothesize 
on why these similarities and differences have developed.  
 
II. Political Corruption and the Government’s Response in Morocco and Tunisia 
Public corruption remains a problem in North Africa.16 Of the six countries that comprise 
the region, Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index17 ranks only two in the top 
half of the least corrupt nations in the world, while two other North African countries are in the 
bottom ten percent.18 The two North African countries in the top half of the Corruption Perception 
Index, Tunisia and Morocco, have adopted reforms in the last ten years to address corruption.19 This 
section will look at the both countries in turn, focusing on the types of public corruption that appear 
in each country, how public corruption and public graft have historically impacted the country, and 
then exploring the recent reforms that have led Morocco and Tunisia to be considered the least 
corrupt in the region. 
A. Morocco 
a. The Manifestations of Public Corruption in Morocco 
Public corruption takes on many different forms in Morocco. It manifests itself in the form 
of the expectation of bribes for public licenses, a lack of independence within the judiciary, and a 
																																																						
16 This paper will define North Africa as including the countries of Algeria, Egypt, Libya, 
Morocco, Sudan, and Tunisia. 
17 The Corruption Perception Index “ranks 180 countries and territories by their perceived levels 
of public sector corruption according to experts and businesspeople.” Transparency International, 
Corruption Perceptions Index 2018, available at https://www.transparency.org/cpi2018 
18 Tunisia and Morocco are in the top half of the least corrupt countries in the world. They are 
tied for 73rd in the world. Meanwhile, Libya and Sudan rank are the two most corrupt countries 
in the region. Libya ranks 170 out of 180 countries on the corruption perception index, while 
Sudan ranks 172. Transparency International, Corruption Perceptions Index 2018, available at 
https://www.transparency.org/cpi2018. 
19 Transparency International, Corruption Perceptions Index 2018, available at 
https://www.transparency.org/cpi2018. 
significant allocation of state resources to those within the king’s orbit.20 Although the 
manifestations of public corruption are varied and at times difficult to fully capture in discreet 
categories, the underlying reasons for public corruption’s foothold in Morocco are fairly 
straightforward.  
There are three basic reasons for public corruption in Morocco. The first reason for the 
prevalence of public corruption in the kingdom is that a culture of impunity and economic 
benefaction for individuals and families in positions of power and close to the monarch continues to 
thrive.21 These well-connected officials have reportedly received numerous elicit benefits from the 
government including receiving state-owned land parcels for less than ten percent of its actual 
value.22  
Another driver of public corruption in Morocco comes from the Morocco’s intermingling of 
the political and economic spheres.23 This is likely the result of the rentier economy, which is an 
economic system where a state receives a portion of its revenues from natural resources that best 
characterized the Moroccan economy until the late-1990s when the economy began to liberalize and 
diversify.24 Although the economy has begun to liberalize, an important aspect of the rentier 
economy still remains. The monarch and those connected to the palace still maintain significant 
influence in Morocco’s economy.25 Since Morocco gained independence from France, the “monarch 
																																																						
20 Morocco Corruption Report, GAN INTEGRITY, available at https://www.business-anti-
corruption.com/country-profiles/morocco/. 
21 Abderrahim Chalfaouat, Corruption is Cripping Morocco’s Nascent Democracy, Middle East 
Monitor (August 5, 2016), available at https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20160805-
corruption-is-crippling-moroccos-nascent-democracy/. 
22 Id. 
23 Denoeux, Corruption in Morocco: Old Forces, New Dynamics and a Way Forward at 138. 
24 Myriam Catusse, Morocco’s Political Economy, HAL 2 (January 10, 2011), available at 
https://halshs.archives-
ouvertes.fr/file/index/docid/553994/filename/CATUSSE_Moroccoa_s_political_economy.pdf. 
25 Guilain P. Denoeux, Corruption in Morocco: Old Forces, New Dynamics and a Way Forward, 
14 Middle East Policy Council 134, 136 (Winter 2007).  
has been the country’s main entrepreneur as well as its largest landowner.”26 The monarch’s 
involvement in economic life has not diminished in recent years. The royal family is still the primary 
shareholder in Morocco’s largest corporation.27 And, commentators insist that “the dominant 
perception in the kingdom is that there is more wheeling and dealing than ever before by the 
monarchy itself.”28 Because the largest economic actors in Morocco also exert the most political 
power, the threat of public corruption or unlawful favoritism toward the royal family’s companies is 
constant.  
Finally, there is a large and pervasive parallel economy that encourages corruption 
throughout the public sector.29 One study estimated the size of the parallel economy from 1999–
2015 to be equivalent to 42.9% of Morocco’s 2015 GDP.30 To maintain a parallel economy of this 
size, public corruption such as bribes to police, judicial officials, and government administrators is 
required.31 The drug trade, which is largely centered around the growth and exportation of cannabis 
in the northern regions of the country and some estimates claim is responsible for $10 billion dollars 
in revenue every year, has been described by the United Nations: Office on Drugs and Crime as 
having a “strong corruption leverage” in Morocco.32 Thus, the drug trade and other industries in the 
parallel economy contribute to the culture of public corruption in Morocco.  
Having discussed the forces at play that lead to corruption, it is necessary to get an idea of 
the types of corruption that are prevalent in Morocco before moving on to a discussion of how 
																																																						
26 Id.  
27 Id.  
28 Id. 
29 Denoeux, Corruption in Morocco: Old Forces, New Dynamics and a Way Forward at 139.  
30 Bourhaba Othmane & Hamimida Mama, An Estimation of the Informal Economy in Morocco, 
8 International Journal of Econimics and Finance 140, 144 (2016).  
31 Denoeux, Corruption in Morocco: Old Forces, New Dynamics and a Way Forward at 139.  
32 Mehdi Ali, Wolfgang Schiefer, & Camilla Lai, Morocco: Country Profile on Drugs and 
Crime, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 16 (2003).  
Morocco has attempted to combat public corruption. There are four general types of public 
corruption in Morocco. The first category involves corruption in the justice system. This type of 
corruption involves both a “lack of independence” and a system of bribery in the judiciary and 
rampant corruption in the police sector.33 In terms of the judiciary, many Moroccan’s view judges as 
not professional and beholden to the monarch or the current government.34 And, two-thirds of 
Moroccan households have paid bribes to a court.35 Turning to the police sector, forty percent of 
households reported that they paid a bribe in 2015, and police rarely face legal or professional 
consequences for these acts of corruption.36 Corruption in the justice system is especially prevalent, 
in the northern regions of the country, where the parallel economy from the drug trade is robust.37  
Second, land, tax, and customs officials often ask for bribes or kickbacks. Third, public 
procurements are greatly afflicted by bribery and patronage. According to the Business Anti-
Corruption Portal’s Morocco Corruption Report, twenty percent of companies “expect to give gifts 
to officials in return for a construction permit and thirty percent of companies “expect to give gifts 
to tax officials.38 The 2015–2016 Global Competitiveness Report on Morocco found that businesses 
often provide bribes to government officials to receive public licenses.39 But, patronage might be an 
even bigger issue as companies controlled by the monarch or the elite are often awarded 
government contracts regardless of the quality of the bid.40   
																																																						
33 Morocco Corruption Report, GAN Business Anticorruption Portal, available at 
https://www.business-anti-corruption.com/country-profiles/morocco/. 
34 Id. 
35 Id. 
36 Id. 
37 Id. 
38 Id. 
39 THE GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS REPORT 2015–2016, MOROCCO, WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM, 
available at http://reports.weforum.org/global-competitiveness-report-2015-2016/. 
40 Id.  
Finally, there is a system of economic patronage that favors those businesses, families, and 
individuals that have close ties to the monarchy or other government officials.41 One area where this 
had traditionally been most prevalent was in the Moroccan military, where the military budget was 
obscured from parliamentary review and only needed the approval of the monarch.42 Under this 
system, it was not uncommon for career military leaders who were favored by the king to amass 
large fortunes.43   
 These four basic types of corruption are what the Moroccan government has tried to curb—
at least nominally—in the past two decades. But, because the three underlying factors leading to 
corruption in Morocco remain prevalent and virtually unchanged by the reform efforts, the results 
of the Moroccan reforms have been largely underwhelming.  
b. Historical Development of Public Anticorruption Law in Morocco 
Morocco’s history of anticorruption policy falls into four distinct time-periods with a gradual 
progression toward reform occurring as the kingdom advances through each period. The first period 
of anticorruption is prior 1998 when there simply was no public effort to fight corruption in 
Morocco. This was in spite of the numerous anticorruption laws that were implemented throughout 
this period. Today, Morocco cites to a number of the laws passed during this period to demonstrate 
compliance with the United Nations Convention Against Corruption including a 1963 law 
																																																						
41	Blanca Camps-Febrer, Layers of Security: The Security Sector and Power Struggle in 
Morocco, 12 CONTEMP. ARAB AFF. 107 (2019).  
42	Id.		
43 In a diplomatic cable sent from the United States Ambassador to Morocco Thomas T. Riley to 
the Secretary or State’s Office and leaked by WikiLeaks, Ambassador Riley states that the single 
biggest challenge the Moroccan military faces is internal corruption. He then details “credible 
reports” of commanders using their positions to extract bribes from military contractors and live 
a “lavish” lifestyle from the profits off of those bribes. See Thomas T. Riley, “Morocco’s 
Military: Adequate, Modernizing, but Facing Big Challenges” (August 4, 2008), available at  
https://web.archive.org/web/20111216055417/http://www.dazzlepod.com/cable/08RABAT727/.
Blanca Camps-Febrer, Layers of Security: The Security Sector and Power Struggle in Morocco, 
12 CONTEMP. ARAB AFF. 107 (2019).  
prohibiting the bribery of domestic and foreign public officials and a 1958 law requiring the 
immediate suspension of public officials that have been convicted of bribery.44 Despite these 
anticorruption laws on the books, these provisions were rarely enforced and public corruption ran 
rampant during these periods. Commentators insist that before 1995 “the word corruption was 
deliberately avoided in public debates” and a mere mention of corruption in the public sphere would 
have been considered “taboo.”45 Around 1995, this trend began to gradually change as non-
governmental organizations, such as Maroc 2020 and Transparency International, began to push for 
reform and brought a conversation about corruption to the public sphere.46 However, it was not 
until 1999 that the Moroccan government showed a willingness to speak about and attempt to 
address the issue.  
The second period of anticorruption was ushered in by the Socialist Prime Minister, 
Abderrahmane El Youssoufi, who became Prime Minister in 1998.47 During this period, 
anticorruption became a political issue that was discussed openly, but the government did little work 
to actively prevent corruption or seriously punish those involved with it.48 After El Youssoufi’s 
Socialist Party lost seats in the 2002 election, King Mohammed VI appointed Driss Jettou, a palace 
																																																						
44 COUNTRY REVIEW REPORT FOR MOROCCO 2015, UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS AND 
CRIME, 15, 38 (2015).  
45 Guilain Denoeux, The Politics of Morocco’s “Fight Against Corruption”, MIDDLE EAST 
POLICY 165, 167 (2000); Mohammed Berraou, The Limits of Anti-Corruption Policies in 
Morocco, MOROCCAN INSTITUTE FOR POLICY ANALYSIS (March 7, 2019), available at 
https://mipa.institute/6551 (“Until the second half of the 1990s, speaking of corruption had been 
a taboo in official Morocco.”).  
46 Id. 
47 Nazar al-Aly, Politics-Morocco: Corrupt Officials Receive Heavy Sentences, INTER PRESS 
SERVICE (April 30, 2001), available at http://www.ipsnews.net/2001/04/politics-morocco-
corrupt-officials-receive-heavy-sentences/. 
48 Mohammed Berraou, The Limits of Anti-Corruption Policies in Morocco, MOROCCAN 
INSTITUTE FOR POLICY ANALYSIS (March 7, 2019) “However, El Youssoufi did not announce any 
offensive strategy in the fight against corruption, although his era witnessed the birth of the 
National Charter for good governance and the launch of a national plan to promote transparency 
and integrity in public administration.”) 
loyalist with no party affiliation.49 Even though Morocco signed and ratified the United Nations 
Convention Against Corruption during the Jettou government, it is universally believed that 
Morocco’s anticorruption policies took significant steps backwards during this period. Jettou, as a 
loyalist to the crown and the appointee of the king, was able to delay the implementation of many of 
the anticorruption policies that El Youssoufi had pushed to implement.50 This led to a significant 
backslide in the Morocco’s Corruption Perception Index ranking.51 
The third period of anticorruption began with the Abbas El Fassi government.52 In the 2007 
elections, El Fassi’s Istiqlal Party added four seats in parliament to amass a plurality, and King 
Mohammed VI asked El Fassi to form a government.53 One of El Fassi’s primary focuses 
immediately after the election was curbing corruption.54 Immediately after forming the government, 
parliament announced through the Official Bulletin, an official periodical that publishes public and 
legal notices in Morocco, that Morocco would make a considerable effort to conform its 
anticorruption efforts to the United Nations Convention Against Corruption.55 To meet this 
ambitious goal the El Fassi government activated the Court of Accounts to oversee corruption 
regarding public funds.56 The Court of Accounts proved to be a valuable asset in fighting corruption 
																																																						
49 Id. 
50 Morocco’s Poor Show, The Economist (September 11, 2007), available at 
https://www.economist.com/news/2007/09/11/moroccos-poor-show. 
51 Mohammed Berraou, The Limits of Anti-Corruption Policies in Morocco. (“[T]hroughout the 
period of the Jettou government (2002–2007), the Moroccan ranking has been steadily declining. 
Notwithstanding the fact that this period marked Morocco’s signature of the International 
Convention against Corruption (2003) and its ratification on 9 May 2007.”). 
52 Id. 
53 Morocco Nationalists Win Election, BBC (September 10, 2007), available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/6982843.stm. 
54 Id.  
55 Mohammed Berraou, The Limits of Anti-Corruption Policies in Morocco.  
56 Id. (“This phase has also witnessed a major event: the activation of the role of the Moroccan 
Supreme Audit Institution (also known as the Court of Accounts) in addressing mismanagement 
and misuse of public funds.”). 
in Morocco. It was able to investigate, report, and impose civil fines on public officials and 
organizations that violated Moroccan bribery and anticorruption law.57 The Court of Accounts also 
had the power to refer criminal cases to Moroccan prosecutors, and it did this fairly successfully 
during the El Fassi government.58 
Despite the success of the Court of Accounts, Morocco’s Corruption Perception Index 
remained relatively the same.59 There was a need for more significant changes. This leads us to the 
modern period of anti-corruption in the Morocco.   
c. Current State of Public Anticorruption Law in Morocco 
Since the ratification of the 2011 Constitution, Morocco has made its most significant efforts 
to address the public corruption issues that have long plagued the kingdom. But, most outside 
observers and commentators are still dissatisfied with Morocco’s progress insisting that once again 
the kingdom’s anticorruption rhetoric and policies do not align with its execution. The critics point 
out that the King and those in the palace’s orbit continue to delay the implementation of 
anticorruption apparatuses and those apparatuses that have been implemented continuously fail to 
effectively carry out the law. Despite these critiques there may be reason to believe that Morocco’s 
anticorruption enforcement is beginning to become more aligned with the country’s anticorruption 
rhetoric and the anticorruption laws that have been passed. This is a phenomenon that was difficult 
to envision twenty-five years ago when the word corruption was not uttered in the public sphere out 
of fear of retribution.  
																																																						
57 Id.  
58 Id.  
59 Id. (“Although Morocco has not improved its global ranking, the main shift in the country’s 
strategy in the fight against corruption has been the practical activation of the Court of 
Accounts…”).  
During the Arab Spring, Moroccans took to the street to petition the government for more 
rights, economic and educational reforms and more effectively implemented anticorruption 
measures. Unlike other Arab nations, the Moroccan protesters did not not openly advocate for the 
overthrow of the regime. The Moroccan monarchy still enjoys significant approval from the public. 
King Mohammed VI acted quickly immediately proposing constitutional reforms that ostensibly 
ceded some of the power the monarch retained to the democratically elected parliament. 
Since the implementation of the 2011 Constitution, there have been a three major legal 
reforms. First, Morocco adopted important whistleblower protection legislation in 2011.60 This law 
brought Morocco in line with the international community on the best practices for protecting 
whistleblowers.61 Second, Morocco addressed issues surrounding public procurements in 2014 when 
it passed new legislation that led to the implementation of internationally recognized best practices 
in the public procurement sector.62 The reform led to the development of a national procurement 
training strategy, a central procurement policymaking body, and an online system to help simplify 
the procurement process.63 The legislation also established an independent body to review any 
company grievances surrounding the issuing of public procurements.64  
Third, Morocco enacted an access to information law in 2018.65 The law, which is similar to 
the Freedom of Information Act in the United States, allows Moroccans to petition the government 
																																																						
60	Morocco: Whistleblowing Overview, Transparency International, 3 (2016) (describing 
Morocco’s Whistleblower protection law passed in 2011 to comply with the United Nations 
Convention on Corruption) available at 
https://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/publication/morocco_whistleblowing_overview. 
61	Id.	
62 Morrocco	Corruption	Report,	BUSINESS	ANTI-CORRUPTION	PORTAL,	available	at	
https://www.business-anti-corruption.com/country-profiles/morocco/.	
63	Id.		
64	Id.	
65	Morocco’s parliament adopted an access to information law in February 2018. Freeom in the 
World 2019: Morocco, FREEDOM HOUSE (2019), available at 
https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2019/morocco. 
to receive access to certain government documents.66 Passing this law ensured that Morocco was in 
greater compliance with the United Nations Convention Against Corruption, which requires its 
signators to guarantee their citizens the right to access information from their government.67 
In addition to these major reforms, the monarch seems to have become a vocal proponent 
of anticorruption policies and good governance. In 2017, King Mohammed VI spoke fervently in 
favor of government accountability insisting that it was past time for corrupt individuals to be 
thrown out of office and positions of leadership.68 He followed up this throne day speech by 
dismissing a number of high ranking officials.69 However, it remains to be seen whether these acts 
are a sign of the monarchs new approach to corruption or merely actions that serve as a show for 
the people of Morocco and the international community.  
B. Tunisia 
a. The Manifestations of the Public Corruption Law in Tunisia 
Similar to Morocco, Tunisia’s public corruption manifests itself in a multitude of ways. But, 
unlike Morocco, where the primary drivers of corruption have remained relatively consistent over 
the past twenty years, Tunisia’s corruption was initially driven by the mafia-style Ben Ali 
government.70 His regime ran rampant with corruption, but the corruption was incredibly 
concentrated. Only those within the Ben Ali inner circle profited significantly off of the public 
																																																						
66	Id.		
67	Id.	
68	Said	Temsami,	Morocco:	Time	For	Accountability	Has	Arrived,	Eurasia	Review	(October	28,	
2017),	available	at	https://www.eurasiareview.com/28102017-morocco-time-for-
accountability-has-arrived-oped/.	
69	Id.		
70 Colin Freeman, Tunisian President Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali and His Family’s ‘Mafia Rule’, 
THE TELEGRAPH (January 16, 2011), available at 
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/tunisia/8261982/Tunisian-
President-Zine-el-Abidine-Ben-Ali-and-his-familys-Mafia-rule.html. 
corruption.71 Although there was a significant amount of corruption during this period, it was so 
centralized and well-organized that many Tunisians did not experience corruption on a daily basis. 
However, since Ben Ali fled the country in 2011, corruption has, in the words of head of the 
Tunisia’s National Anti-Corruption Authority, Chawki Tabib, “democratized.”72 It is no longer a 
mafia-style rule, instead there is wide-spread petty corruption without a central figure at the head. 
Tunisians are reporting that since democratizing, they are experiencing more corruption in their day-
to-day life.73 Without the Ben Ali family serving as the strong central force to keep lower officials in 
line, petty officials seem to have taken it upon themselves to extract bribes and other forms of 
payment from individuals and businesses that they exercise jurisdiction over. This type of petty 
corruption may not create the serious issues that affect the core of government, like the corruption 
in the Ben Ali regime did, but rampant petty corruption leads to a perverse chipping away of 
people’s trust in government.  
Having discussed the reasons for corruption during the Ben Ali era and after the democratic 
revolution, it is necessary to look at the types of corruption that currently plague Tunisia. First, like 
Morocco, bribery in customs administration, land administration, and tax administration run 
rampant in Tunisia.74 One in ten businesses report that they expect to pay bribes to either land 
administration officials or customs administrations officials to get basic government tasks 
accomplished.75 Although bribery does not appear to be a major issue within the tax administration, 
businesses and individuals report that a culture of favoritism has developed in this government 
																																																						
71	Id.		
72 Tunisia’s Fight Against Corruption: An Interview with Chawki Tabib, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT 
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agency. This leads to instances where some businesses or individuals feel empowered to skirt the tax 
rules, while the less connected can often feel like they are being targeted by tax officials.76 
Second, basic public services have become increasingly corrupt since Tunisia ousted Ben Ali 
and instituted a democracy.77 According to the Bertelsmann Transformation Index, an analytical 
collaboration between over 300 academic institutions across the world to detect the strengths and 
weaknesses of political systems throughout the globe, this increase in corruption in public services 
has resulted in significantly more Tunisians reporting that they expect to pay bribes when using or 
requesting public services.78 Additionally, the corruption in the public service sector is also felt in 
government hiring. The Bertelsmann Transformation Index reported that many of the civil servants 
implemented shortly after the 2011 revolution were unqualified for the jobs they received and 
benefited from political patronage.79  
Finally, the police have long been considered one of the most corrupt institutions in 
Tunisia.80 Twenty-five percent of the country believes that the police are corrupt, but only a handful 
of individuals reported paying a bribe.81 However, unlike Morocco, Tunisia enjoys relatively little 
judicial corruption. Only twelve percent of the country views the judiciary as corrupt. Additionally, 
foreign companies have often been successful at seeking redress through the Tunisian legal system 
when necessary.82  
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 After this discussion of the primary drivers of corruption in Tunisia and the way that 
corruption manifests in the country, the next section will briefly discuss the historical development 
of public anticorruption in Tunisia.  
b. Historical Development of Public Anticorruption in Tunisia  
Unlike Morocco’s history of anticorruption, where a few prime ministers and parliaments 
have been able to implement gradual anticorruption reforms to chip away at a culture of corruption, 
Tunisia’s modern anticorruption approach has only two distinct time periods: the period under the 
Ben Ali dictatorship and the democraticly elected governments that followed after the fall of the Ben 
Ali regime. Under Ben Ali, Tunisia was described by some commentators as a “kleptocracy,” a 
government run by those whose primary aim is personal enrichment to the detriment of the 
governed.83 During this period, Ben Ali’s family and those close to him amassed significant fortunes 
through a system of bribes, kickbacks, and patronage. Although the government was incredibly 
corrupt, the centralized nature of the corruption made it so fewer Tunisians actually felt the 
corruption on a day-to-day basis.84  
Although there was rampant corruption during the Ben Ali era, Tunisia attempted to show 
to the international community that it was conforming to international norms regarding corruption. 
Tunisia signed the United Nations Convention Against Corruption in 2004 and ratified the 
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document in 2008.85 However, despite signing and ratifying the Convention, there was very little or 
no effort domestically to enact asset declaration, access to information, or whistleblower protections 
that were either recommended or required by the document. It was not until after the fall of the Ben 
Ali regime that Tunisia made significant legislative efforts to rid the country of corruption.  
c. Current State of Public Corruption and Public Anticorruption Law in Tunisia  
When Tunisians were polled about why they protested against the Ben Ali regime during the 
Arab Spring, more than 60% responded that it was “to protest against corruption.”86 This was by far 
the most popular answer over other possible responses such as demanding greater political freedom 
(20.2%), opposing an authoritarian regime (25.3%), or economic problems (47.8%).87 Thus, it was 
no surprise to see immediate legislative changes addressing corruption immediately after Ben Ali 
fled. The first day after Ben Ali’s ouster, the transitional government established the Commission of 
Inquiry into Misappropriation and Corruption.88 The agency was meant to quickly reform the most 
corrupt parts of the Ben Ali regime. Since the Commission of Inquiry into Misappropriation and 
Corruption was established in 2011, Tunisia has implemented five additional important pieces of 
anticorruption legislation.  
First, less than a year after democracy was established in Tunisia, the government established 
the National Anti-Corruption Authority, which was a government agency designed to promote 
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anticorruption work and gather data on corruption.89 The agency is still responsible for the majority 
of the government’s anticorruption work in the country. Second, in 2013, the legislature passed 
legislation to reexamine and remedy past instances of corruption.90 It accomplished this by forming 
the Truth and Dignity Body to investigate economic and human rights crimes that occurred under 
the Tunisian government from 1995 to 2013.91  
From 2016 to 2018, Tunisia passed the final three significant pieces of legislation for this 
period. All three of these laws sought to bring Tunisia’s statutory law into congruence with the 
requirements of the United Nations Convention Against Corruption.92 In 2016, parliament passed 
the first of these laws with the passage of an access to information law. A year later parliament 
passed a bill granting protection to whistleblowers and witnesses at criminal trials.93 Finally, in July 
2018, the government passed an expansive Illegal Enrichment Law requiring certain public 
employees including the president, judges, and ministers to publicly declare all of the property they 
own.94 
Despite these reform efforts, Tunisians still perceive their government as corrupt. Over sixty 
percent of Tunisians believe that the government is performing “fairly badly” or “very badly” in its 
efforts to curb corruption.95 In fact, many Tunisians believe that there is more corruption now than 
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there was before Ben Ali was ousted from power.96 Some commentators believe that this spike in 
the perception of corruption is likely due to the phenomenon of democratizing corruption.97 No 
longer is only a small inner circle connected to the dictator of the country reaping the benefits from 
corruption. Instead, the illicit benefits of corruption are open to everyone in Tunisia.98 This has led 
to more forms of petty corruption that plague Tunisians in their day-to-day lives. According to some 
commentators in Tunisia, corruption is simply becoming part of the everyday culture.99  
This feeling of rampant corruption was exacerbated in 2017, when Tunisia’s parliament 
passed a law granting amnesty to the former dictator Ben Ali.100 Critics of the law point out that it is 
a display of legislative corruption and cronyism as it was the only law of the term proposed by 
President Beji Caid Essebsi, who had been a senior official under Ben Ali.101 Therefore, even though 
the post-Ben Ali period has seen significant legislative efforts to crack down against corruption, 
many in Tunisia remain unsatisfied with the government’s anticorruption efforts.  
III. Analysis of the Current Anticorruption Regime in Tunisia and Morocco 
Anticorruption efforts in Morocco and Tunisia are similar in a number of respect. Both 
countries have implemented similar legal regimes to combat corruption, both face similar internal 
and external pressures to crack down on corruption, and both have struggled to muster the political 
will to create true and lasting reform. These similarities are largely a product of being in a similar 
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region and facing similar problems. Perhaps more enlightening than looking at the similarities 
between the two countries is the examination of the differences between the two anticorruption 
regimes. There are two primary differences between the two anticorruption regimes. These 
differences include the speed at which reform is implemented and the exemption or non-exemption 
of the head of state from the anticorruption laws. These differences are largely a product of the 
different systems of government in Morocco and Tunisia and shed light on how a country’s 
government structure can have a profound effect on anticorruption policy. 
A. Discussion and Analysis of the Similarities Between Morocco’s and Tunisia’s 
Anticorruption Regimes 
The most obvious similarity between the anticorruption efforts in Morocco and Tunisia is 
that both countries have enacted similar (and sometimes identical) policies to combat corruption. 
Although there are a few differences between the countries’ anticorruption policies such as an asset 
declaration law in Tunisia that employs a broader definition of public official than the same law in 
Morocco, these differences remain relatively minor. 102 The similarities, on the other hand, are readily 
apparent. Both countries have recently enacted asset declaration laws,103 access to information 
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laws,104 and seemingly strong whistleblower protection laws.105 Additionally, both countries have 
created a similar set of ostensibly independent bodies to review and investigate public corruption. In 
Tunisia, this is the National Anti-Corruption Authority (INLUCC), which was established in 2012 to 
investigate and report on public corruption.106 In Morocco, the National Commission for Integrity 
and Anti-Corruption (NCIAC) serves an almost identical function.107 
These similarities in anticorruption policy and anticorruption institutions are no mere 
coincidence. They stem from two sources. First, both Morocco and Tunisia signed and ratified the 
United Nations Convention against Corruption, and many of the anticorruption efforts enacted 
recently have been in an effort to better comply with this Convention. Specifically, both Morocco’s 
and Tunisia’s whistleblower protection acts and asset declaration laws are meant to conform to the 
recommendations and requirements of the Convention.  
In addition to the influence of the United Nations Convention against Corruption, both 
Tunisia and Morocco have been influenced by non-governmental organizations, which generally 
follow and advocate for similar best practices. In Morocco, non-governmental organizations such as 
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Maroc 2020 and Transparency Maroc were credited with bringing corruption issues to the forefront 
of the national conversation in the late 1990s.108 Now, non-governmental organizations are playing a 
pivotal role in exerting influence over law makers and administrative officials in Tunisia and 
Morocco, which leads to the implementation of similar policies. In Tunisia, non-governmental 
organizations such as I Watch and Transparency International have served a pivotal role in helping 
to draft laws that comply with the Convention against Corruption and monitoring the 
implementation of these laws.109 Similarly in Morocco, Transparency International, Maroc 2020, and 
Transparency Maroc monitor anticorruption efforts in Morocco. 
Second, both Morocco and Tunisia have similar internal and external motivations for 
wanting to adopt anticorruption policies that conform with international norms and appear strong 
against corruption. The internal rationale for adopting strong anticorruption policies is that 
corruption is a primary issue of concern for the citizens of both countries and can prove to be 
destabilizing to the government.110 Immediately after the Arab Spring, protesters across North 
Africa and the Middle East said that their number one reason for protesting against their respective 
governments was because of public corruption.111 Therefore, to avoid civil unrest and domestic 
backlash, both Tunisia and Morocco have decided to make a concentrated effort to demonstrate an 
effort to combat corruption. 
The external rationale for adopting these policies and acceding to international pressure to 
implement stronger anticorruption laws and institutions is economic in nature. Tunisia’s and 
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Morocco’s economies are increasingly reliant on foreign investment and their connection with 
Europe.112 Because of their geographical position on the continent, both are vying to be Europe’s 
primary entry point in to Africa.113 To attract foreign investment, both Morocco and Tunisia 
understand that they have to project an anticorruption image to the international business 
community. Thus, both have been conscious of their rankings in anticorruption perception lists, 
such as Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index, and both have made it a priority 
to have their rankings climb in the coming years.114  
 The final similarity is a common detriment to Morocco’s and Tunisia’s anticorruption 
regimes that both countries must attempt to mitigate. In the last ten years, both countries have 
demonstrated what commentators have called “a lack of political will” when implementing their 
anticorruption policies.115 This lack of political will stems from partisan politics, which has shown a 
propensity to take precedence over anticorruption reform and justice.116 In Morocco, the Court of 
Accounts, which audits the financial holdings of each political party, has been frequently attacked by 
politicians and political parties for its rulings and oversight reports.117 In one particularly 
inflammatory incident, the former leader of the Istiqlal Party compared the judges on the Court of 
Accounts to “terrorists.”118 These partisan attacks on apolitical, anticorruption institutions and 
judges can ultimately undermine public trust in anticorruption efforts.  
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Tunisia’s political will to fight corruption has also been weakened by partisan politics. In 
addition to the partisan reactions to National Anticorruption Authority decisions, Tunisia has faced 
a number of partisan disputes over presidential pardons for close allies convicted of corruption and 
parliamentary grants of amnesty to Ben Ali and a number of his subordinates.119 These efforts to 
excuse past violations of corruption demonstrated to many that in Tunisia partisan politics matters 
more to Tunisia’s political class than actual anticorruption reform.  
The lack of political will is a serious concern for Tunisian leaders. In a 2017 interview, 
Chawki Tabib, the head of the National Anticorruption Authority, insisted that what Tunisia needs 
at the moment is “political will” to root out corruption and become “one of the 50 most transparent 
countries within the world” according to Transparency International’s Corruption Perception 
Index.120 This sentiment has been echoed by others that serve on the National Anticorruption 
Authority. Mohamed Ayadi, a member of the National Anticorruption Authority, insists that many 
of the problems with Tunisia’s anticorruption systems are simply due to a lack of collective effort.121  
 Thus, Tunisia’s and Morocco’s anticorruption policies and institutions have struggled to rise 
above partisan politics. In order for both countries to reach their goals of appearing more 
transparent, both will need to refocus on anticorruption efforts, which may require politicians to 
stop turning anticorruption issues into partisan political issues when it is to their party’s advantage.  
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B. Discussion and Analysis of the Differences Between Morocco’s and Tunisia’s 
Anticorruption Regimes 
 There are two major differences that play a crucial role in understanding the practical and 
theoretical differences between Morocco’s and Tunisia’s anticorruption efforts. These differences 
are largely due to different government structures. In Morocco, the monarch plays a significant role 
in the way that the anticorruption regime operates. As the biggest driver of corruption in the 
country, the king is constantly undermining the reform efforts of his more liberal prime ministers by 
slowing down the implementation of new reform initiatives. But, because the king is considered 
completely above the law, he is able to speak out against corruption and selectively give out harsh 
punishments for certain violators of anticorruption law. On the other hand, in Tunisia, the largest 
corrupting force, the Ben Ali dictatorship, was ousted almost nine years ago. But, living in a new 
democracy, even without this significant corrupting force, has led to significant challenges for 
Tunisia. This subsection will explore these differences and attempt to explain why they have 
occurred.   
 The most obvious difference between the anticorruption efforts in Tunisia and Morocco is 
the speed which anticorruption efforts are implemented. In Morocco, anticorruption initiatives are 
implemented slowly and the monarch is often responsible for slowing the roll out of these new 
initiatives. This occurred with the National Commission for Integrity and Anti-Corruption, an 
independent body created by the 2011 Constitution to “initiate, coordinate, supervise, and assure the 
implementation” of anticorruption policies.122 It was not until December 2018, more than seven 
years after the ratification of the constitution, that King Mohammed VI appointed someone to lead 
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the Commission.123 During the interim period, the Commission remained, in the words of one 
commentator, “practically frozen.”124 In comparison, Tunisia’s reforms are often sweeping and 
immediately implemented. There is no powerful moderating force like the monarchy in Morocco to 
slow these reforms. For instance, the 2018 asset declaration law, which was passed in July, was 
immediately implemented.125 The National Commission for Integrity and Anti-Corruption began 
accepting declaration forms later that year, and sent demand notices to any public official who had 
not submitted a declaration form by February 2019.126  
 The difference in speed at which reforms are implemented can have profound practical 
effects. First, a gradual roll out, the pace of which is controlled by the king, can lead to ineffective 
enforcement as it places corrupt actors on notice well in advance of the laws and institutions going 
into effect. But, slow roll outs have significant upside. It means that projects and reform initiatives 
are judged on a longer continuum, and it ensures multiple positive reactions from the commentators 
and outside observers. For example, when the King of Morocco finally appointed a leader of the 
National Commission for Integrity and Anticorruption, a headline from a regional online and print 
publication read, “King Mohammed VI Leads Fight Against Corruption.”127 The article conveniently 
ignored that it was the monarch’s delay that “practically froze[ ]” the Commission for seven years.128  
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In contrast, Tunisia has had to pay the price of bad news coverage for its swift 
implementation of anticorruption policies. The asset declaration law which was passed in July 2018 
and immediately implemented has been judged harshly by many in the Tunisian media.129 News 
articles in January reported that only one-third of the expected asset declarations had been made.130 
This led a number of commentators to criticize the program and government calling both 
ineffective.131  
Thus, the delayed implementation of anticorruption policies in Morocco gives the world the 
impression that Morocco is steadily moving to an ever more effective anticorruption regime. 
Meanwhile, Tunisia’s swift implementation may catch and punish more corrupt actors than 
Morocco’s, but at the price of looking like it is moving in fits and starts toward a better 
anticorruption regime.   
 The final difference between the two anticorruption regimes is that the monarch remains 
above the law in Morocco, while the anticorruption laws in Tunisia reaches every public official. In 
Morocco, the king is above the law in both statutory, social, and constitutional way. Statutorily, the 
king exempt from complying with almost every anticorruption law, including the asset declaration 
law.132 The king also has additional statutory protections that place the king above the law. For 
instance, it remains illegal to speak ill of the monarch, even under the expanded speech protections 
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under the 2011 Constitution.133 These speech laws preventing dissent against the monarch have been 
enforced in the last ten years for things as trite as political cartoons posted on Facebook.134 With 
laws like this being enforced in the kingdom, it is unrealistic to think that true charges of corruption 
could be brought against the monarch. Thus, these statutory protections grant the king impunity 
from any charges of anticorruption.  
Equally important to the king’s impunity from corruption law is the kings place in Moroccan 
society. Since the 1990s, in addition to being the head of state, the Moroccan monarchs have 
claimed to be the religious leader of Morocco.135 A recent study found that the majority of 
Moroccans view the monarch as having actual religious authority. The idea of levying charges of 
corruption against not only the permanent head of state, but the spiritual leader of Morocco, is 
highly improbable.  
However, the king’s impunity does not stop with the statutory or social. Even if the statutory 
law were amended and the monarch’s social status as the permanent head of state and spiritual 
leader were somehow revoked, his powers under the Moroccan constitution would still make it 
difficult, if not impossible, to bring corruption charges against him. Not only does he appoint the 
head of the anticorruption body,136 but he also has a heavy role in judicial appointments at all levels 
including the constitutional duty to appoint six of the twelve justices on the Constitutional Court 
including the Chief Justice who represents the tiebreaking vote.137 These powers grant the king an 
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added layer of security against the possibility that Morocco’s anticorruption laws could be turned 
against him.    
By contrast in Tunisia, every public official is subject to the anticorruption laws. Under the 
asset declaration law in Tunisia, every government official including the Prime Minister and the 
President must declare his or her assets.138 From a cultural or social perspective, Tunisia does not 
have a permanent head or state or a national religious figure in the same way Morocco views its 
monarch. Additionally, the Tunisian constitution does not grant broad appointment powers to the 
Prime Minister or the President. Instead, most of the appointment powers granted in the 
constitution are diluted because the appointees have to be recommended by a different body139 or, in 
the case of Constitutional Council, the the presidential appointments do not amount to a majority of 
the council.140 Thus, the threat of a judicial system that could not rule fairly on corruption charges 
against top officials is muted.  
The fact that the monarch is exempted, both statutorily, culturally, and constitutionally from 
Morocco’s anticorruption law and all of Tunisia’s public officials are subject to the anticorruption 
laws implemented by the legislature is a crucial difference in two respects. First, as discussed above, 
the monarch is the largest driver of public corruption in Morocco, yet he is exempted from the 
anticorruption laws enforced in the country. Although Morocco has recently demonstrated a 
diligence in attacking smaller acts of corruption and removed some ministers believed to be involved 
in corruption from office, the fact remains that the largest and most corrupting force, the monarchy, 
is left without a check. Tunisia’s anticorruption regime on the other hand attempts to grapple with 
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top-level corruption in the country as no public official is exempt from its corruption laws. Thus, it 
appears as though this difference will lead to more significant corruption reform in Tunisia, where 
corruption at the highest levels is actually being addressed.  
Second, as a system where the king is completely insulated from the any anticorruption 
mechanism, the Moroccan system allows the monarch to openly and vigorously condemn 
corruption in all its forms. He can encourage and advocate for stringent punishments for those who 
violate the laws of good government without any fear that his words will one day be turned on him. 
King Mohammed VI did just that in a 2017 public address where he insisted that Morocco would 
adopt a “zero tolerance” policy toward corruption in order to promote “public trust and investors’ 
confidence.”141 These strong statements against corruption tend to create the desired effect. They 
give the impression to the Moroccan public and investors abroad that Morocco is cracking down on 
corruption. The results bear themselves out in the Transparency International’s Corruption 
Perception Index, where Morocco has seen dramatic improvements in how the world perceives the 
country, despite Morocco’s failure to wrestle with the most significant corruption.142  
 In Tunisia, no public official enjoys this type of freedom. Public officials know that they 
could be out of power by the end of the next election cycle, so they are forced to be more measured 
in their rhetoric and actions against corruption. Any public stance they take or any legislation they 
pass on anticorruption could be used against them when they are out of power. This is likely another 
reason why, despite being unpopular among the Tunisian electorate, the amnesty bills for Ben Ali 
and a number of officials in the Ben Ali regime successfully passed through the Tunisian 
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Parliament.143 Public officials, many of whom have committed past corruption violations, cannot 
simply adopt a zero policy because it could be quickly turned against them. 
Therefore, having a monarch that is above the law, both formally and practically, can be a 
benefit because it permits the leader of the country to project a tough-on-corruption stance to the 
people and the international community. But, it is unlikely that this system will lead to true and 
lasting anticorruption reform, especially when the leader exempt from anticorruption laws is a 
significant driver of corruption.  
  
IV. Conclusion 
When examining anticorruption regimes in North Africa, Morocco and Tunisia represent the 
lone bright spots in the region. Both have implemented similar pieces of anticorruption and good 
governance legislation in an effort to comply with United Nations Convention Against Corruption. 
Both countries are intent on complying with the UN Convention to boost foreign direct investment 
and demonstrate to the electorate that the government takes corruption seriously. However, both 
countries have experienced their fair share of struggles when it comes to mustering up the political 
will to fully implement their anticorruption agendas.  
Even more interesting than the similarities between the two anticorruption regimes are the 
differences, which largely have to do with the different government systems the two countries have. 
Morocco’s constitutional monarchy with a powerful king makes it difficult for Morocco to quickly 
implement anticorruption reform efforts unless the king is fully supportive of the efforts. On the 
other hand, Tunisia’s democracy makes implementation swift because there is no moderating force 
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like the steady hand of the king. However, because Tunisia is a democracy, where no individual is 
above the law and politicians can be out of power after the next election cycle, Tunisia’s politicians 
have been unwilling to match the anticorruption fervor of their electorate that want to implement 
zero-tolerance policies on corrupt politicians. In Morocco, the fact that the king is above the law and 
in no fear of being prosecuted means that he is free to appear as hardline on corruption as possible.   
 
